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This paper arises from two recent, inter-related strands in the comparative analysis of 
welfare  states.  First,  Esping-Andersen’s  (1990)  celebrated  Three  Worlds  analysis  has 
spawned a rich literature on welfare regimes and the place of individual countries (and 
groups)  of  countries  in  his  typology.  Ireland’s  place  in  the  worlds  of  welfare  is 
ambiguous. Esping-Andersen (1990: 35-78) locates Ireland in the liberal category on the 
basis of its low de-commodification score. However, in analyzing the detailed attributes 
of welfare states he describes Ireland as having low scores on socialist regime attributes, 
low scores on liberal attributes and medium scores on conservatism. A standard work on 
comparative  social  policy,  however,  unambiguously  describes  Ireland  as  ‘Catholic 
corporatist’ (Cochrane and Clarke, 1993), a description that owes much to the role of the 
Catholic  church  in  one  well-documented  instance  of  Church–state  conflict  in  social 
policy and to the persistent adherence of the population to Catholic moral norms and 
religious practice well in to the 1980s.  
 
Recent commentaries on specific aspects of social policy also allude to the corporatist 
elements in Irish social policy. For example, Millar and Adshead elaborate on Cochrane 
and Clarke’s analysis and in an institutionalist analysis of the health care regime conclude 
that the “‘Catholic corporatist’ paradigm is still a fruitful one in investigations of the Irish 
welfare state” (Millar and Adshead, 2004: 18). In the case of social security, Daly and 
Yeates point to the strong British influence in the emergence and later development of the 
system, but they also highlight a “new corporatism” as an important factor in the recent 
development of social security policy (Daly and Yeates, 2001:94). This account rests on 
the existence of formal, national social pacts in which some aspects of social protection     Geary WP/4/2006  3 
policy are formulated in a consultative process involving the government and the social 
partners.    
 
Cousins’ (1997) observations on Esping- Andersen emphasize aspects of the Irish welfare 
state that highlight some similarities with the Mediterranean and semi-peripheral states- 
late  industrialization,  clientilist  and  populist  politics,  strong  agrarian  influences  and 
centralized state structures. More recently, Bonoli (1997) offered a ‘two dimensional’ 
analysis of both the scale of state social spending and the source of revenue (whether 
taxation or social insurance). This exercise identifies Ireland as having a low level of 
state spending and a low share of social insurance in social spending, and therefore firmly 
locates Ireland in the liberal world. 
 
Indigenous  analysts  have  tended  to  focus  on  Ireland’s  late,  state-sponsored 
industrialization in an already globalised world economy. This perspective, stressing the 
role  of  the  state  in  simultaneously  achieving  economic  development  and  social 
improvement, has given rise to the recent characterization ‘developmental welfare state’ 
(O’Riain and O’ Connell, 2000; Breen, Hannan, et al, 1990, NESC, 2005).  
 
Second, the welfare regime literature has been enriched by the search for the normative 
basis of various regimes. A number of researchers have analysed international data sets 
with a view to ‘matching’ the three-worlds typology with cross-national variations in 
normative support for the welfare state. (Papadikis, 1992; Peillon, 1995; Svallors, 1997; 
Gelissen, 2000; Gelissen, 2001; Bonoli, 2000; Quadagno and Blekesaune, 2003). To date, 
the  outcomes  of  this  research  have  been  somewhat  inconclusive.  On  the  one  hand, 
Gelissen (2000:298-299), reports from his study that “ [no] evidence was found for the 
thesis  of  there  being  a  relationship  between  the  type  of  welfare  state,  as  defined  by 
Esping-Andersen,  and levels of popular support for the welfare state”.  On the other, 
Svallors  (1997:  295)  found  support  for  regimes  in  the  form  of  “rather  clear-cut 
configurations regarding the aggregated levels of attitudes” (albeit four rather than three 
regimes in this study). Likewise, Andrefs and Theien (2001) offer support for regime-
consistent  variation  in  welfare  state  attitudes.  Taylor-Gooby  (1991)  suggested  that     Geary WP/4/2006  4 
welfare regimes’ norms might be distinguished not by their overall level of legitimation, 
but by the patterns of cleavage within regimes; corporatist regimes, for example, will 
display strong support for employment and social insurance based welfare. This line of 
reasoning has yet to be confirmed or refuted. 
 
Ireland’s  profile  in  these  comparative  studies  is  puzzling:  in  the  limited  evidence 
available it is consistently recorded as having a very high level of welfare state legitimacy 
– one that is intuitively implausible, or at least puzzling. The next section outlines this in 
more detail.  
 
Against  this  background,  Bonoli  (2000)  argued  that  the  inconclusiveness  in  the 
comparative studies derives from a reliance on an overly narrow definition of welfare 
state legitimacy. Pointing out that much of the comparative work relies on the ISSP items 
about the role of government specifically in relation to social protection, he suggests 
(2000:432) that: 
 
the analysis of welfare regimes cannot be limited to the welfare state only, but must 
be expanded and encompass other sources of non-market based economic security, 
such as labour laws and collective bargaining by labour market actors. These sources 
of economic security play an important role in many European countries and do affect 
people’s  perceptions  of  what  is  appropriate  practice  in  given  areas  of  social 
protection. They are part of the traditional political economy of nations, and can be 
expected to translate into observable patterns of what mass publics expect from their 
governments in terms of social protection.  
 
Bonoli analysed public attitudes towards a range of political economy issues- as distinct 
from social protection – and showed that when this wider definition of social protection is 
adopted, it is possible to clearly identify welfare regimes. Our analysis bridges these two 
concerns. We draw on national survey data about attitudes to social policy in an attempt 
to clarify the dimensions of welfare state attitudes, and we offer a view, based on these 
data, about what ‘type’ of welfare state the Irish population legitimizes.     Geary WP/4/2006  5 
 
We go beyond Bonoli’s approach and set out a framework for the analysis of the link 
between  the  welfare  state  and  cultural  values,  offering  an  analysis  of  welfare  state 
legitimacy in Ireland based on a wide range of survey data. To anticipate our findings, we 
confirm the value of a ‘broad’ approach, and we report a legitimation picture of Ireland 
that is somewhat liberal in orientation. This leads us to conclude that accounts of Ireland 
that emphasise its so-called corporatist traits require revision, and that the liberal patterns 
of legitimation are strongly consistent with policy and observed outcomes.  
 
Ireland in the ISSP  
 
Table 1 below summarises the existing published data on the aggregate levels of welfare 
state support in Ireland along with selected data from countries representing the three 
worlds-  West  Germany  (Corporatist),  Norway  (Social  Democratic),  United  Kingdom 
(Anglo-Saxon)  These data record very high levels of welfare legitimacy for Ireland. 
Peillon’s study based on the 1990 ISSP role of government items shows that its welfare 
legitimacy equates with that of the former GDR, leading him to note “striking popular 
support for the welfare state in Ireland” (Peillon, 1995: 3) Support for social protection in 
Ireland is significantly higher in these data than that for the UK, and yet Irish provisions 
and policies have remained close to their British origins. In each of the rows of the table 
the overall level of welfare legitimacy is as high – or higher- than the figure for the social 
democratic regime. This picture contrasts with Ireland’s allocation to the liberal category 
in  most  of  the  welfare  regime  literature  (Bonoli,  1997:  Castles  and  Mitchell,  1993: 
Esping-Andersen,  1990).  The  details  of  welfare  state  support  in  the  table  report  the 
figures in Peillon’s (1995) paper. A similar pattern is evident in the 1996 unpublished 
ISSP data (data not given here). On the corresponding items in this later data set the 
aggregate levels of welfare support are as high in Ireland – or higher- than corporatist or 
social democratic countries.  
 
Following Gelissen’s (2001: 495-501) discussion, we can note two broad approaches to 
understanding  cross-national  differences  in  beliefs  about  redistribution.  The     Geary WP/4/2006  6 
institutionalist model argues that beliefs and opinions are influenced by social structure: 
what people consider fair and legitimate will reflect the actual distribution of rewards and 
outcomes. In contrast, the ideology model argues that societies have specific cultural 
traditions, relations and values that affect the development of attitudes. These values then 
underpin  the  institutions,  attitudes,  and  social  and  economic  regulation  that  comprise 
welfare regimes. The point about the data in Table 1 is that whichever general approach 
is taken to beliefs and attitudes it implies a broad convergence between beliefs and actual 
institutions- or presumably the absence of a very marked divergence.  
 
The contrast with international variations in the share of social spending in GNP- an 
acceptable proxy here for the size and redistributive intent of the state- is equally striking. 
Without resorting to the assumption that this figure should closely follow in descending a 
social democratic- corporatist – liberal sequence, the data are at odds with the beliefs 
data. Ireland’s figure of 15% is less than half that of the social democratic case and 
substantially lower even than the liberal case. It is also important to note that the patterns 
recorded in Table 1 are not dependent on the specific countries chosen as exemplars of 
the regimes, and that the results hold no matter which individual countries are chosen.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary Data on Aggregate Levels of Welfare State Support and Social 
Expenditure as Percent of GDP in Ireland and Selected Countries. 
Selected ISSP data: % Agreeing role 
of government is to … 
Social 
Democratic 
Corporatist  Liberal  
 
Ireland 
Role  of  government  item  (1990): 
pensions  
98.0  94.7  99.0  98.1 
Role of government item 
(1990):unemployed  
90.6  78.3  80.0  90. 6 
Role  of  government  item  (1996): 
reduce rich/poor income differences 
73.3  49.4  66.7  78.1 
Role  of  government  item  (1996): 
decent housing 
74.1  77.9  86.6  93.9 
Social  Expenditure  as  %  of  GDP 
(2001) 
32.0  30.8  25.0  14.5 
Source: Peillon (1995) and OECD 
 
 
Finally in relation to Table 1, the aggregate social expenditure data may understate the 
extent of the divergence between the high level of welfare legitimacy and the extent of 
welfare  provision and redistribution.  Detailed accounts  of  social  protection,  pensions,     Geary WP/4/2006  7 
health care, child care, housing and other aspects of social policy in Ireland point to the 
relatively modest role of the state in these areas. For example, the state pensions system 
is  a  simple,  flat-rate  pension  offering  a low  replacement  of  earnings; the  health  care 
system does not offer comprehensive coverage and, in fact, institutionalizes differential 
and  unequal  access  as  between  public  (lower  income)  and  private  (higher  income) 
patients; there is no direct state provision of child care services for working parents and 
the housing system is overwhelmingly private with a very limited role for social housing- 
all of this is underpinned by a low tax burden. This pattern of policy and provision is- not 
unexpectedly-  reflected  in  poorer  social  outcomes  than  in  most  EU  and  many  other 
developed  economies;  these  include  a  higher  than  average  rate  of  child  poverty,  the 
highest rate of pensioner poverty, low levels of life expectancy by European standards, 
high mortality differentials between social classes, and greater than average dispersion in 
earnings and  incomes  (McCashin, 2004;  McCashin,  2005;  Wren,  2003;  Nolan,  2000; 
Nolan and Nolan, 2004). All of this suggests that we need to re-examine attitudes to 
welfare in Ireland, going beyond the ISSP role of government items and exploring a 
broader approach to the normative basis of welfare regimes. 
 
A Broader Approach 
 
Our  analysis  of  the  normative  basis  of  the  welfare  state  builds  on  the  framework 
elaborated by Pfau-Effinger (2005). She argues that - notwithstanding the growing body 
of empirical cross-national work on attitudes to welfare – there has been insufficient 
conceptual clarity about the role of culture in the welfare state. Invoking the concept of 
‘welfare culture’ as the ‘relevant ideas in a given society surrounding the welfare state 
and the way it is embedded in society’, Pfau-Effinger points out that there are three levels 
of welfare culture: values and models as a basis for policy; cultural values and beliefs in 
the  population  at  large;  and  public  and  political  discourses  that  mediate  between  the 
attitudes of the public, on the one hand, and political decisions, on the other (2005: 4-10). 
The implication of this distinction between levels of culture is that existing research on 
welfare regimes and legitimacy is focused only on one level of culture- popular beliefs. 
This may help to explain the inconclusive findings in the research to date.      Geary WP/4/2006  8 
 
Turning to the specific content of welfare culture, Pfau-Effinger outlines the key domains 
of welfare beliefs and ideals. 
 
The cultural foundations of policies towards work and employment: this refers to ideas 
about the role of employment in peoples’ lives, expectations about which social groups 
should  be  integrated  into  employment,  and  ideas  about  how  social  protection  and 
employment should be connected; 
 
Cultural ideas about citizenship and social inclusion: here the point is that welfare states’ 
policies are based on notions of ‘solidarity’ and ‘integration’ and these may vary. 
 
Cultural basis of redistribution: welfare policies reflect, in part, underlying beliefs about 
justice  and  redistribution,  and  populations  will  vary  in  the  relative  importance  they 
ascribe to need, fairness, personal responsibility, incentives and so on, as the criteria for 
structuring remuneration systems, and tax and social policies generally. 
 
Cultural values about poverty: Differences across countries in beliefs about the causes of 
poverty may be related to differences in welfare states’ policies. Specifically, the extent 
to which poverty is regarded as the fault of the individual rather than inflicted by society 
may be a crucial factor in shaping a welfare state. For example, those cultures (typically 
the US) that emphasise individual effort are unlikely to sustain strongly interventionist or 
redistributive social policies. 
 
Cultural ideas about state-market relationships: Populations may differ about the roles of 
the state and the market in the economy, both in terms of the general beliefs about the 
state and beliefs about state versus market provision in specific areas of policy (health, 
employment, price control, wage determination, income inequality, taxation etc.) 
 
Cultural ideas about services, the welfare mix and the family: Populations differ in terms 
of cultural preferences about the mix of family, state and market in the production of     Geary WP/4/2006  9 
welfare,  and  this  may  lead  to  quite  different  types  and  levels  of  provision  of  social 
services in relation to the elderly, children, and so on. 
 
At  a  conceptual  level,  it  is  obviously  possible  to  debate  the  underlying  logic  of  the 
separate elements of welfare culture.  Equally, it is a matter for empirical research to 
determine whether, and to what extent, these a priori elements of welfare culture exist in 
reality in specific contexts, and whether these supposed elements of welfare culture can 
be identified statistically as specific dimensions of public attitudes.  For our purposes, we 
will use the framework outlined above and give an overview of the welfare culture in 
Ireland.  In  this  exercise  we  draw  on  a  national  representative  survey  of  social  and 
political attitudes in (the Republic of Ireland), the Irish Social and Political Attitudes 
Survey (ISPAS). This survey was undertaken in Spring 2002 and had a total sample of 
2,500  persons  aged  18  and  over  drawn  from  the  electoral  register.  The  survey 
questionnaire  was  administered  by  the  fieldwork  team  of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Research Institute and contained a core questionnaire covering demographic and related 
variables and four attitudinal modules: using a split-design sample, one half of the total 
(1250) were administered the core questionnaire and two modules on race/ethnicity and 
the environment; the other half were administered the core and two other modules- one 
on gender and the family and one on attitudes to social justice. Our analysis is therefore 
based on the 1,250 respondents in the latter half of the sample design whose views we 
elicited on a range of social justice items. A full account of the research design, sampling 
strategy, and details of the attitude items is given in a forthcoming publication (Garry, 
Payne, and Hardiman, 2005). 
 
In this paper, we sought to explore and identify the range of dimensions of welfare state 
attitudes in Ireland, to create meaningful scales from the items selected in the factor 
analysis and to examine the characteristics of individuals who held the range of attitudes 
exhibited by the scales identified. It should be stated that the attitude items were not 
formulated with a view to testing the specific elements outlined in Pfau- Effinger, but 
taken as a whole our data span many of the domains she outlines. The ISPAS survey 
elicited respondents’ beliefs about inequality, the role of the state in the economy, the     Geary WP/4/2006  10 
relationship  between  gender,  family  and  work,  the  causes  of  individuals’  poverty- 
whether personal or societal, the relative roles of the family and state in care provisions, 
the role of private market provisions and incentives, wealth, and welfare provisions for 
minorities. Although ISPAS contained many questions about specific aspects of current 
policies  in  Ireland,  we  confine  ourselves  to  material  about  general  beliefs  (following 
Bonoli’s strategy). 
 
The relevant details about the factor analysis are given in the appendix. After a variety of 
analyses  the  results  there,  based  on  a  Principal  Component  Analysis  using  Varimax 
Rotation, represent what might be close to the most satisfactory analysis possible. The 
KMO (0.716) and Bartlett’s (chi-square = 5387.061, df=435, sig .000) tests confirm the 
statistical adequacy of the factoring exercise. Second, the factors explain 46% of the 
variance, when thirty items are included in the analysis. The sharp ‘scree’ diagram in the 
appendix allows an intuitive understanding of the factors and their relative importance.  
 
We have identified seven factors which combined items that could be scaled, while also 
capturing the range of the underlying attitudinal dimensions on the Irish welfare state.  
These seven scales and their corresponding factors are given in Table 2 below and the 
items belonging to each of the scales are identified in factor analysis output, given in the 
appendix. To determine the degree to which the items in the same scale measure the same 
aspects of the respondents’ perception of the Irish welfare state, a measure of internal 
consistency, the Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 1951) was computed to 
provide reliability data for the factors identified. The results are presented in Table 2. As 
indicated there, the highest alpha reliability was obtained for the scales of Social Care, 
Maternal  Employment  and  Familialism/Male  Breadwinner  and  the  lowest  reliability 
(0.55) for Income Inequality. While Nunnaly (1978) has indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable 
reliability coefficient, lower thresholds are sometimes used in the literature, particularly 
in exploratory work (Reynaldo and Santos, 1999).  
 
The first scale measures the familiar Familialism/Male Breadwinner syndrome. This 
reflects items about women’s role in the home, views about the impact on the family of     Geary WP/4/2006  11 
married women’s labour market participation, and so on. The relevant items here all have 
loadings in the range .5 to .8. It is important to note that the questionnaire contained an 
entire module on aspects of the family and public policy. Hence the importance of this 
factor may be, in part, an artifact of the sheer number of relevant items. However, the 
factor stubbornly asserts itself in a variety of factor analyses using different items and 
varying numbers of items. 
 
 
Table  2:  Mean,  Standard  Deviation  and  Cronbach  Alpha  Reliability  of  Irish 
Welfare State Attitudinal Scales. 
 
Scale  Mean  Std Dev  Alpha 
 
Familialism/Male Bread winner (Factor 1)  16.7  4.26  0.72 
 
Individualist/Liberal (Factor 2)  38.16  6.6  0.60 
 
Social Care (Factor 3)  21.9  5.56  0.80 
 
Private Welfare (Factor 4)  17.9  5.17  0.67 
 
Income Inequality (Factor 5)  28.16  5.49  0.55 
 
Maternal Employment (Factor 6)  7.27  2.39  0.73 
 





Second is a mixed Individualist/Liberal scale. The scale pulls together a range of items 
concerning  attitudes  to  wealth  accumulation  and  the  role  of  government, 
inclusion/exclusion of minorities in Irish society and attitudes to individualist effort. Here 
one of the items asked respondents to agree (or otherwise) that wealthy people should be 
allowed to pass on wealth to their children without the government imposing taxes, and 
another item posed the statement that taxes should kept low to encourage people to work 
even  if  this  means  greater  income  inequality.    The  individualist  attitudes  are  also 
identified largely from the questions about why some are poor and some well-off and it 
expresses an individualist explanation of poverty; people are poor because they waste     Geary WP/4/2006  12 
money, or do not work hard enough. This factor also reflects what Pfau-Effinger refers to 
as  cultural  beliefs  about  social  inclusion  and  integration,  and  incorporates  attitudes 
towards  immigration  and  resettlement  provisions  and  policies  towards  Ireland’s 
indigenous, nomadic minority, the Travelers.  
 
A Social Care scale emerges from a battery of survey items that asked respondents to 
choose the relative importance (from 0 to 10) of the state or the family in responding to 
these care needs: the costs of supporting older people at home, giving financial support to 
carers, helping older people in the community, and meeting the costs of child care for 
working parents. All three items in relation to care for the elderly loaded highly on the 
same factor.  However the fourth item relating to meeting the costs of child care did not 
load  on  this  factor  but  in  fact  does  loaded  more  highly  on  a  later  factor,  Maternal 
Employment, which identifies attitudes to working women and support for families.  
 
The fourth scale, which we term Private Welfare emerges from the items that identify 
beliefs about fairness. Here respondents were asked about whether private provision and 
its associated inequalities in terms of access to health, education, pensions and housing is 
fair. The logic underpinning these items is that issues of social equity and fairness are 
articulated in Ireland the context of the hybrid, public-private mix in Irish social policy.  
 
A fifth scale identifies attitudes to Income Equality. The items here relate to the question 
about why respondents believe some people are poor and some are well off. These items 
are indicative of a societal dimension to respondents’ perception of why some people are 
poor and some are well-off; because the government does not give enough money to 
people on social security, or employers do not pay enough, or because people only do 
well if they have money to begin with. The loadings on the underlying factor here range 
from 0.5 to 0.6.  
 
A  sixth  factor,  Maternal  Employment,  emerges  quite  separately  from  the  general 
familialism factor. The former has two items that load heavily; first, ‘there should be 
financial benefits for child care when both parents work’, and, second, ‘working mothers     Geary WP/4/2006  13 
should get paid maternity leave’. The third item related to who should have responsibility 
for  the  cost  of  childcare,  the  government  or  the  family  loaded  quite  poorly  (0.47).  
Strikingly, these items do not load on familialism no matter what combination of items is 
included, nor do they load in specifications with a smaller number of factors. This result 
echoes the gender-based analyses of welfare states in Lewis (1992) and Siaroff (1994). 
The latter offered a four-category typology of countries one of which was Late Female 
Mobilisation: this category included Ireland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain. 
Our  data  seems  to  support  the  notion  that  the  later  development  of  women’s  work 
participation – and social and political discourses associated with this transition- may be 
a  defining  characteristic  of  some  welfare  states.    In  defining  the  scale,  Maternal 
Employment, we chose to leave aside the third item “who should have responsibility for 
the  cost  of  childcare,  the  government  or  the  family”,  to  improve  the  overall  alpha 
coefficient of the scale. 
 
The seventh and last scale which we label Corporatism embodies items which relate to 
government  intervention  in  the  production  rather  than  the  distribution  aspects  of  the 
economy including should industry be free of state control, and should businesses be 
entirely  free  or  strictly  controlled  by  the  state?  Interestingly,  items  such  as  ensuring 
adequate pay for all workers and other items tapping support for non-market criteria for 
pay, did not emerge in this factor. The items in this factor, combined with its limited 
explanatory power, suggest that corporatism, in the terms illustrated by Bonoli, is not an 
important dimension of welfare culture in Ireland. 
 
Before turning to the results of the multivariate analysis, some general points about the 
research findings presented so far should be noted. While we did not set out to formally 
identify the elements of welfare culture in Pfau-Effinger’s framework, the results seem to 
support a broad notion of welfare culture of the type she outlines. We established that 
there are clear dimensions related to family/labour market attitudes and to notions of state 
versus family responsibility for care services. We examined attitudes to distributional 
issues and found that there are clear dimensions related to people’s notions of fairness, to 
their beliefs about why people are poor, and to social integration. As regards the efforts in     Geary WP/4/2006  14 
existing research to ‘place’ Ireland in regime terms, there is one relevant finding. We 
found one dimension that we identified as lndividualist/liberalism , and one of very low 
explanatory  power  that  is  quite  corporatist.  While  the  Individualist/Liberal  factor 
explained nearly twice as much variance (7.5%) as the corporatism factor (4.4%), neither 
of these results are particularly striking given the overall pattern of factors identified as 
well  as  the  pattern  of  variance  explained  across  these  factors.    These  results  are  not 
sufficiently clear to allow us to characterize Ireland as either liberal or corporatist in 
terms of beliefs. The results -on balance- seem to confirm in normative terms Esping- 
Andersen’s summary of Ireland’s regime attributes; it is low on both corporatism and 
liberalism.  Overall,  the  analysis  highlights  the  analytical  challenge  of  understanding 
welfare  culture  in  socio-political  contexts  where  Left-Right  cleavages  have  not  been 
central to welfare state developments and where, consequently, distributional and socio-
economic issues are poorly mobilized and less salient.   
 
 
Attitudes to Welfare in Ireland 
In this section we present in Table 3 below a descriptive overview of some of the key 
findings with regard to our analysis of the pattern of attitudes to welfare in Ireland. For 
ease  of  presentation,  we  have  recoded  each  of  the  seven  scales  to  a  binary  form, 
indicating  agreement  or  disagreement  with  the  scale.  The  percentage  of  those  in 
agreement  or  disagreement  with  each  scale  is  analyzed  in  terms  of  the  respondents’ 
socio-economic  status,  age  and  gender.  The  statistical  chi-square  significance  of  the 
percentage values across the different categories of respondents for each scale analyzed is 
also given.  We examine the  effect of the (independent) variables socio-economic status, 
age  and  gender  on  the  distribution  of  attitudes  in  a  scale  (dependent),  using  logistic 
regression;  the  percent  of  variance  in  the  dependent  variable  explained  by  the 
independents  as  well  as  ranking  the  relative  importance  of  the  independents.  In  our 
analysis,  five  of  the  seven  scales  could  be  successfully  modeled  using  these  three 
independent  variables,  while  for  two  scales  (private  welfare  and  corporatism)  no     Geary WP/4/2006  15 
satisfactory model incorporating these independent variables could be fitted.
2 Finally in 
the last part of this section we present the Inter-scale correlation to examine whether there 
                                                 
2 In a later version of this paper, we can extend the range of independent variables used to fit the logistic 
model.      Geary WP/4/2006  16 
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Note:  Chi-Square Significance  *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 
  Familialism/Male Breadwinner item Agree: “A man’s job is to get the money, a woman’s is to look after the home” 
  Individualism/Liberal item Agree “Hard work makes the difference between making a lot of money and very little” 
  Social Care item Agree: “Parents/family (not state) should take full responsibility for cost of help for Elderly living alone in the community” 
  Private Provision item Agree: “It is fair that people with more money can afford to get a better education for their children” 
  Income Inequality item Agree: “The Government does not give enough money to people on Social Welfare”  
  Maternal employment item Agree: “Working women should receive paid maternity leave when they have a baby” 
  Corporatism item Agree: “Most of industry should be state owned and run”     Geary WP/4/2006  17 
is any pattern emergent from the clusters of scales where there is high/low inter-scale 
correlation.   
 
Table 3 shows that there is a moderate level of agreement with male breadwinner views
3. 
There is a clear pattern in the cross-tabulations: older respondents consistently record 
support  for  male  breadwinner  views  and  the  differences  are  not  only  statistically 
significant but also quite large. However there are also differences across the population 
in terms of age and socio-economic status. More men than women support the male 
breadwinner model while those from higher socio-economic groups tend to reject it. An 
examination  of  support/rejection  of  the  individual  items  making  up  the  Male 
Breadwinner scale show that women are more likely than men to agree that maternal 
employment affects pre-school children, and higher socio-economic groups are far less 
likely to agree with a male job/female care arrangement. 
 
The Individualist/Liberal scale combines items on support for immigrants in Irish society, 
as well as attitudes to poverty and wealth distribution in Ireland. The results show strong 
support for the scale and for items statements such as “Hard work makes the difference 
between making a lot of money and very little”. The strong statistical differences in terms 
of the support for the scale with regard to individuals’ socio-economic status and age, 
whereas gender is not a discerning variable. Surprisingly perhaps, a higher proportion of 
those who support the individualist/liberal model come from the lower socio-economic 
groups  whereas  the  results  for  age  categories  suggest  that  of  those  who  reject  the 
individualist/liberal agenda, the substantial proportion of these are younger. Our earlier 
individual  item  analysis  provides  some  useful  insights  for  this  overall  scale  analysis 
(McCashin and Payne, 2005).  The immigration and asylum seeker items recorded some 
not unexpected findings. There is very general support for immigration restriction and 
socio-economic variation in attitudes; for both items the lower socio-economic groups 
were  substantially  more  restrictive  in  their  attitudes.  Overall,  this  suggests  that  more 
complete data on a range of social groups would reveal clear boundaries in the Irish 
                                                 
3 Some caution must be attached to the results presented in Table 3 which examine the pattern of attitudes 
across different aspects of welfare in Ireland, given that each of the scales has been re-coded to a binary 
format.     Geary WP/4/2006  18 
population in terms of the social groups that are accorded access to full social rights. 
There are a number of items that indicate an individualist perspective on the causes of 
poverty.  The  figures  from  our  earlier  individual  item  analysis  suggested  pervasive 
support for individualist perceptions of poverty and this support does not vary by socio-
economic status: in the case of the distinctly punitive attitude (people who are badly off 
just waste the money they have) those in lower socio-economic groups are more likely to 
agree.  Men  and  older  adults  are  also  more  likely  to  agree  with  these  views.  The 
difference between the effort and hard work items on the one hand and the punitive item 
is marked: there is very little agreement with this judgmental view about the failings of 
the poor. The findings about wealth run somewhat in the same direction as those for 
poverty. There is pervasive support for limited state taxation. Over 70% of the population 
believe that the rich should be allowed to pass on their wealth to their children without 
the state taking some of the wealth in taxation, and also believe that taxes should be kept 
low to encourage people even if this means greater inequality. As in the case of the 
poverty items, where there are statistically significant differences they run in the ‘wrong’ 
direction: the lower socio economic groups are more likely to endorse these views. 
  
Turning to the Social Care scale, the data here are clear-cut, with a very large majority 
opting for the state end of the continuum when asked whether family or state is the 
appropriate source of support. There is little evidence of an age cleavage here, except for 
the  item  on  responsibility  for  older  persons  in  the  community.  Individual  scale  item 
analysis (not reported directly here) shows that there is a higher (statistically significant) 
proportion  of  older  people  opting  for  the  family  rather  than  the  state,  but  the  actual 
difference  is  quite  small.  There  significant  statistical  differences  between  men  and 
women  with  more  women  supportive  of  state  intervention  in  the  care  of  the  elderly 
whereas men prefer a family-based model.  
 
The results for the Private provision scale are interesting on a number of levels. Looking 
at the results presented in Table 3, there are no significant differences or cleavages across 
individuals in terms of age, gender or socio-economic status yet overall as much as 40% 
of the respondents rejected this forms of welfare provision. Moreover, an individual item     Geary WP/4/2006  19 
analysis  indicates  that  some  individual  items  generate  significant  differences  across 
respondents and these are discussed further below. The items which make up this scale 
were formulated with a view to the institutional mix in Ireland of public and private 
provision  and  finance  in  social  policy,  and  the  political  and  ideological  discourses 
associated with this mix. In health, pensions and education, Irish provision is far from the 
comprehensive, universal model of provision familiar in so many areas of the welfare 
state in so many countries. For example, access without charge to the full range of health 
services is available to only 30 % of the population, and private health insurance plays a 
significant role in structuring access to a wide range of services- notably hospitals. This is 
associated with differentiated and unequal utilization of health care; accordingly, this 
two-tier system is implicated in public debate about fairness and equality (Wren, 2003).  
 
Similarly, the pensions and education system have distinct fault-lines that differentiate 
public and private provisions. In the former case, the state pension is a Beveridge-style 
flat-rate benefit set at about 30% of earnings. The generality of private sector employees 
do not have income-related pensions and some are dependent on the modest, last-tier 
means-tested  pension.  Employers  face  no  legal  requirements  to  fund  occupational 
pensions, and hence these pensions are concentrated among higher income groups and 
they are subsidized by substantial tax relief. These tax reliefs now cost the budgetary 
equivalent of state spending on social security pensions and benefit only those in the 
higher  income  groups.  In  this  context  a  high  and  rising  proportion  of  the  elderly 
experiences relative income poverty (McCashin, 2005). Turning to education, the state is 
extensively  implicated  in  the  financing  and  management  of  what  are,  in  practice, 
privately  owned  institutions.  At  the  second-level  of  the  system,  the  funding  streams 
differentiate  those  schools  that  are  wholly  reliant  on  state  funding  from  those  that 
selectively  recruit  from  higher  socio-economic  groups  with  a  combination  of  state 
subsidies and private fee income. As in the case of health care, this hybrid, public-private 
mix results in sharp and visible differentiation in access to schools and ultimately third 
level education.  
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These provisions- unusual in an international context- are historically rooted and deeply 
institutionalized,  and  they  provide  the  context  in  which  the  attitudes  of  the  Irish 
population about fairness are formed. It is important to note that the items are focused, 
not on specific policy choices, but on general beliefs. Specifically, the respondents were 
asked to agree or not that: ‘It is fair that… Overall, the data suggest a high tolerance for 
the institutionalized inequality on which these aspects of Irish social policy are based: for 
all  three  items  there  is  a  majority  of  the  view  that  the  underlying  principle  of  these 
arrangements is fair. Nor is there a marked socio-economic pattern in the results. In the 
area of education the higher socio economic groups were more likely to disagree with 
private provision; while the result is statistically significant, the difference in the overall 
level of agreement between the highest and lowest socio-economic groups is less than 
10%. Moreover, the result may be an artifact of the compressed, three category socio-
economic scale. Age and gender recorded one statistically significant result each; women 
are more likely to disagree with the advantages of private health insurance, and the young 
population (18 to 34) is more likely to repudiate the private funding of education. These 
results may be reflecting an implicit element of self–interest, with women as primary 
carers more likely to experience the health care system and young people likewise in 
education. However, our data are not sufficient to test a general self-interest model, and 
the observed gender and age differences are quite modest. 
 
Table  3  also  reports  on  support  for/disagreement  with  items  comprising  the  Income 
Equality Scale. Three of the items refer to the question about why respondents think 
some people are poor, and the fourth item is one of a series about wealth and fairness. 
The figures show pervasive sympathy for a societal perspective on poverty and wealth, 
with a very substantial majority indicting employers’ low pay rates as a cause of poverty. 
However,  these  data  do  not  necessarily  provide  an  endorsement  to  legitimation  for 
redistributive  policies,  nor  do  they  express  class  based  attitudes.  First,  our  earlier 
individual  item  analysis  (not  reported  here)  indicated  that  only  half  agree  that  great 
disparities in wealth are unfair. Furthermore while the socio-economic differences are 
statistically  significant,  the  actual  percent  differences  between  high  and  low  socio-
economic groups are again quite small- in all cases less than 10%.     Geary WP/4/2006  21 
 
The results for the Maternal Employment scale are also reported in Table 3. There is a 
reasonable level of support for state policies underpinning maternal employment. Our 
earlier  individual  item  analysis  showed  that  the  issue  of  maternity  benefits  is  not 
contentious: over 90% support such provisions. However, the figure for financial support 
for child care costs is only 61%, and the same figure applies regarding the statement that 
working  mothers  can  have  just  as  warm  a  relationship  with  children  as  their  non-
employed  counterparts.  The  pattern  of  statistical  significance  shows  a  relationship 
between gender and all three variables in the expected direction. Men were less likely to 
endorse the policy statements than women, but these differences are not large.  
 
The  Corporatism  scale  shows  that  there  is  very  little  endorsement  of  what  might  be 
typically corporatist opinions. These refer to the state’s direct role in the economy, for 
which there is little overall support. In passing, it should be noted that a specific, policy –
worded question about the detail of Ireland’s legal minimum wage showed a very large 
majority in favor of a legal minimum, and the corporatist items here are not a reflection, 
therefore,  of  public  attitudes  about  pay  and  government’s  role  in  pay  determination 
processes. 
 
In Tables 4-8, the results of the logistic regression analysis are presented. Only five of the 
seven scale could be modeled using logistic regression analysis and the three independent 
variable age, socio-economic status and gender. Remaining scales could not be modeled 
with regression modeling.  For each of these five tables, the B values for the intercept are 
the log odds-ratios of being in agreement versus opposing the scale (Disagreement with 
scale, the reference category) if all the independent variables are zero (Upper class, old 
and female).   
 
Looking at Table 4, the effects of socio-economic class origin are positive indicating that 
the lower the class origin of the individual, the more probable it is that he/she will be in 
agreement with the  familialism/male breadwinner model and that the effect is strongest 
for the lower socio-economic versus highest socio-economic category. The negative sign     Geary WP/4/2006  22 
associated with the variable age show that there is a reduced probability for younger age 
categories compared with older categories of being supportive of a familial or “male 
breadwinner” view of welfare represented by the statement “A man’s job is to get the 
money, a woman’s is to look after the home”. Finally there is also a higher probability 
that men rather than women will be in agreement the familial/male breadwinner model.  
For Table 4, the majority of the results presented are strongly significant.  
 
Table 4: Results of Logistic regression: Familialism/Male Breadwinner scale and 
Social-economic status, Age and Gender.  
 





Variables                                 
Agreement  
with the  
Familialism/ Male Breadwinner scale 
 
(Scale item example: “A man’s job is to get  the 
money, a woman’s is to look after the home” 
 






























Total N= 1240 
Reference category (dependent variable): Disagreement with the Familial/ Male breadwinner scale. 
Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic has a chi-
square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects are significant. 
Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 103.9 with 5 df and significant. 
Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R




Table 5 presents the results for the Individualist/Liberal scale. Again the effects of socio-
economic class are positive and strongest for the lower socio-economic versus highest 
socio-economic category, indicating the lower an individual’s socio-economic group, the     Geary WP/4/2006  23 
more likely they will agree with the individualist/liberal view of welfare indicated by the 
statement “Hard work makes the difference between making a lot of money and making a 
little”. As with Table 4, negative sign for the age variable indicates that the younger an 
individual  is  the  lower  probability  that  they  will  agree  with  the  individualist/  liberal 
model. Gender is not a significant independent variable in this model.  
 
Table 5:  Results of Logistic regression, Individualism scale and Social-economic 
status, Gender and Age. 
 




Variables                                 
Agreement with  Individualist/Liberal Scale 
(Scale item example: “Hard work makes the 







































Total N= 1240 
Reference category (dependent variable): Disgreement with the Individualist/Liberal scale 
Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald 
statistic has a chi-square distribution with 1 df. The values under Sig. show that most effects 
are significant. 
Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 29.64 with 5 df and significant. 
Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R
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In Table 6 the results of the logistic regression for the Social care scale are presented. 
Interestingly there are two different signs associated with the Socio-economic variable, 
indicating that the further an individual’s socio-economic status is from the highest socio-
economic  group,  the  less  likely  it  is  they  will  agree  with  the  social  care  scale.  This 
suggests that respondents from lower socio-economic categories are more likely to want 
greater government intervention in the provision of care and responsibility for the costs 
of this care of the elderly in the community. Men are also much less likely to agree with 
the social care model where families or parents take full responsibility for care of the 
elderly. On the other hand the younger you are, the more likely it is you will agree with 
this social care model. Overall however, the statistical results for this model are not very 
satisfactory with relatively few of independent variables indicating statistical significance 




Table 6: Results of Logistic regression, Social Care scale and Social-economic status, 
Age and Gender.  
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with the  
Social Care scale 
 
(Scale item example: “Parents/family (not 
govt) should take full responsibility for cost of 
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Total N= 1240 
Reference category (dependent variable): Disagreement with the Social Care scale. 
Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic 
has  a  chi-square  distribution  with  1  df.  The  values  under  Sig.  show  that  most  effects  are 
significant. 
Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 12.611 with 5 df and significant. 
Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R




In Table 7, there are only two independent variables age and gender which are significant 
in the logistic regression model presented for the Maternal Work scale. The negative sign 
indicates that it is less probable that men will agree the scale and for instance will be less 
likely to agree with the statement “Working women should receive paid maternity leave 
when they have a baby”.  On the other hand there is a positive probability with age where 
younger age categories are more likely to agree with the statement and this independent 
variable is also highly statistically significant. 
 
Table 7:  Results of Logistic regression, Maternal Work scale and socio-economic 
status, age and gender.  
 





Variables                                 
Agreement  
with the Maternal Work 
scale. 
 
(Scale item example: : “Working women 
should receive paid maternity leave when they 








































Total N= 1240 
Reference category (dependent variable): Disagreement with the Maternal work scale. 
Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic 
has  a  chi-square  distribution  with  1  df.  The  values  under  Sig.  show  that  most  effects  are 
significant. 
Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 45.825 with 5 df and significant. 
Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R





Table 8: Results of Logistic regression: Income Inequality scale and social-economic 
status, age and gender. 





Variables                                 
Agreement  
with the  
Income Inequality Scale 
 
(Scale item example: “The Government does 







































Total N= 1240 
Reference category (dependent variable): Disagreement with the Income Inequality scale. 
Standard error in parentheses; *p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001 (two tailed tests). The Wald statistic 
has  a  chi-square  distribution  with  1  df.  The  values  under  Sig.  show  that  most  effects  are 
significant. 
Model Fitting Information: Chi-square is 31.32 with 5 df and significant. 
Pseudo R square: Nagelkerke R
2  0.041  
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Finally Table 8 presents the results for the Income Inequality scale where there is only 
one  significant  independent  explanatory  variable,  the  socio-economic  status  of  the 
individual.  The  results  indicate  that  the  lower  the  socio-economic  category  of  the 
individual,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  they  will  agree  with  statements  such  as  “The 






Our  analysis  started  from  the  point  that  the  conventional  (ISSP)  data  about  welfare 
legitimacy confers a high level of legitimacy on the Republic of Ireland. Our analysis 
conveys a distinctly different picture- one that suggests an institutionalized acceptance of 
some processes that sustain marked inequality. Furthermore, although our data on this are 
tentative, it is possible that a liberal-individualist element has taken root in Irish public 
attitudes. This is not surprising perhaps in the context of Ireland’s exceptional prosperity 
in the last decade or so. However, it is also clear that income adequacy/inequality is a 
separate theme in Irish public attitudes. The co-existence of this element, along with the 
support for private welfare and an emergent liberal individualism across all social groups, 
point  to  the  existence  of  what  Kluegel  (1989)  and  his  colleagues  termed  ‘split-
consciousness’. Social care and related services for the elderly is the one area of social 
policy where there seems to be a generalized belief in state intervention.   
 
The data throw some light on the persistent problem of placing Ireland in regime terms. 
At one level they offer evidence about beliefs that vindicate Esping-Andersen: there is no 
strong, consistent evidence pointing to either liberalism or corporatism as belief systems. 
However, the weak forms of liberalism and corporatism that we identified should be 
considered alongside the findings on private welfare and wealth. Taken together, these 
may all suggest that more thorough research would portray Ireland as having moved 
decisively into liberal mode. One striking finding is the clarity of the familialism/male 
breadwinner dimension, highlighting the importance of the late female work mobilization     Geary WP/4/2006  28 
that Ireland has experienced, and the centrality of this transition in a society that had 
intensely idealized the male breadwinner paradigm.  
 
On a wider note the analysis gives tentative support to a framework for comparative 
analysis based on the notion of a multi-dimensional welfare culture. Much of the research 
is based on the role of government module in the ISSP and, as Gelissen (2000) has 
pointed out, these data only touch on views about how extensive government should be. It 
may be that in regimes lacking salient left-right political cleavages and reflecting the 
hybrid influences of British liberalism and Catholic familialism the value of such a multi-
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Analysis weighted by WGTYELL
Component Number



















































pre school child-suffer if
mother works
family life suffer-when
woman has ft job
most women really want
home & kids










strict limit on no.
immigrants
everyone in irl-better off
than 5yrs ago
wealthy pass on to
kids-w/out taxes
badly off just waste
money they have
govt shld keep taxes low
some-dont make effort to
help themselves
not have put up-halting
sites in n/hood
hard work-diff bet make
lot/little money
















govt doesnt give enough
social welfare
to become well off-start
out with money
employers dont pay
enough to some wkers







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
 
     Geary WP/4/2006  35 
Total Variance Explained
3.125 10.417 10.417 3.125 10.417 10.417 2.456 8.186 8.186
2.611 8.702 19.120 2.611 8.702 19.120 2.262 7.541 15.727
2.172 7.240 26.359 2.172 7.240 26.359 2.176 7.252 22.979
1.745 5.817 32.177 1.745 5.817 32.177 2.081 6.938 29.917
1.530 5.099 37.275 1.530 5.099 37.275 1.868 6.227 36.144
1.430 4.766 42.041 1.430 4.766 42.041 1.629 5.428 41.573























































Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings




     Geary WP/4/2006  36 
Rotated Component Matrix a
.782            
.737            
.654            
.605            
.571            
  .559          
  .533          
  .532          
  .524          
  .451          
  .446          
  .437          
  .426          
    .865        
    .806        
    .803        
      .782      
      .762      
      .748      
      .493      
        .608    
        .573    
        .571    
        .571    
        .544    
          .821  
          .731  
          -.474  
            -.702
            .685
family life suffer-when
woman has ft job




most women really want
home & kids
h/wife as fulfilling as
working for pay
wealthy pass on to
kids-w/out taxes
strict limit on no.
immigrants
everyone in irl-better off
than 5yrs ago
govt shld keep taxes low
badly off just waste
money they have
not have put up-halting
sites in n/hood
hard work-diff bet make
lot/little money
















govt doesnt give enough
social welfare




poor are getting left
behind
employers dont pay
enough to some wkers
financ b/fit,child care-both
parents wk








1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 6 iterations. a. 
 